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MARTIN V. A-1 HOME APPLIANCE CENTER:
A CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE ON RELIANCE-BASED
THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Bogdan Buta ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Martin v. A-1 Home, 1 an apparently mundane case
of personal injury (in which the victim sought to trigger the
liability of a company that allegedly was in a master-servant 2
relationship with the tortfeasor) puts into question the practice of
importing common law principles into matters governed by the
Louisiana Civil Code.
Should a Louisiana court be able to look to established
common law principles to render a final decision when there is no
direct and clear norm from the Civil Code nor a direct line of
jurisprudence constante on the issue? Does this equate to the
legislative gap contemplated by article 4 of the Louisiana Civil
Code? 3 Is the equity mentioned in article 4 enough for a judge in

∗ LL.M. Candidate (2014), Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hébert
Law Center. Research Assistant to Professor Christine Corcos. The author
would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his guidance throughout
writing this note. Also, special thanks are owed to Alexandru-Daniel On,
Professor Grace Barry, and Jennifer Lane.
1. Martin v. A-1 Home Appliance Ctr., Inc., 12-784 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/30/13), 117 So. 3d 281 [hereinafter Martin].
2. Though largely used in American literature, the language of “master”
and “servant” should be replaced by the dichotomy “employer-employee,” thus
also following the European trend in Tort Law. An example of such a transition
can be seen in a recent Louisiana Tort Law casebook: JOHN M. CHURCH,
WILLIAM R. CORBETT & THOMAS E. RICHARD, TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND
LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 515-51 (Vandeplas Publ’g 2008).
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages.”
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Louisiana to immediately look at the Restatement of the Law in
order to find a solution? 4
Apart from what may seem just a purely theoretical debate, a
better understanding of existing civilian concepts could provide
answers to these questions. This case note scrutinizes, in its first
part, the flow of arguments used by the court, and, in its second
part, offers an alternative theoretical system, consistent with the
civil code, but with a different outcome from the decision rendered
by the court in Martin.
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Mr. Martin, bought a refrigerator from one of the
defendants, A-1 Home Appliance Center, Inc. (hereinafter A-1). 5
After purchasing the refrigerator, the defendant’s employee told
Mr. Martin that, in exchange for a $75 fee, they would deliver the
product to the customer's home. The plaintiff agreed and paid this
additional service. A couple of days later, Mr. Martin was called
and informed that the refrigerator would be delivered the next day.
That next day, the plaintiff was called again by a representative of
A-1, indicating that they were in the area, ready to deliver the
refrigerator. While trying to lift the refrigerator over the kitchen
counter inside Mr. Martin's house, the deliverymen appeared to be
losing control of the appliance. According to Mr. Martin's
testimony, he voluntarily and uninvitedly stepped in and grabbed
one side of the refrigerator, trying to rebalance the refrigerator and
prevent it from falling over the counter. Once the plaintiff got hold
of the refrigerator, its entire weight fell upon him and resulted in
the tearing of his right bicep muscle. 6 This arm injury required

4. Alain Levasseur, Civilian Methodology: On the Structure of a Civil
Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693, 699 (1970). Addressing this issue, the author
concluded that “in a codified system of law, whatever is not explicitly laid down
in the articles will of necessity lie in the domain of uncertainty and controversy.”
5. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 282.
6. Id.

2013]

MARTIN V. A-1 HOME APPLIANCE CENTER

681

several surgeries and a prolonged period of rehabilitation, and Mr.
Martin sought to recover the cost of the damages incurred.
The plaintiff found out that the deliverymen were not A-1’s
employees as he initially thought, 7 but that they were working for
another company, Johnson Delivery Service (hereinafter Johnson);
A-1 contracted with Johnson in order to make deliveries of its
appliances. The plaintiff filed a personal injury action against both
A-1 and Johnson, and their insurance companies.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
At trial, before the verdict was delivered, Mr. Martin settled
with Johnson and its insurer for the amount of $100,000.
Additionally, the jury returned a verdict exonerating A-1, and
finding only Johnson liable for the injury. The reasoning behind
this decision originated from the fact that there was no indication
of an employer-employee relationship between A-1 and Johnson,
the latter being an independent contractor. 8 Following the denial of
Martin's motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appealed the decision. 9
Mr. Martin argued that the trial judge erred in not instructing
the jury that A-1 could be jointly liable for the acts of Johnson
under the theory of “apparent authority.” 10 The plaintiff contended
in his appeal that this is a second theory of recovery, distinct from
the theory of vicarious liability. 11
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, reiterating the lack of
any relationship between A-1 and Johnson, which would otherwise
fall under article 2320, and also by distinguishing the fact pattern
7. Id.
8. Id. at 283.
9. Id. at 282.
10. Id.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320:
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by
their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which
they are employed. . . .
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or
employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the act which
caused the damage, and have not done it.
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in the present case from a Louisiana Supreme Court case,
Independent Fire Insurance Company v. Able Moving and Storage
Company, Inc. 12 The court found that the “apparent authority”
theory was not applicable to the facts of Martin, 13 and reaffirmed
the challenged judgment.
IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary is divided in two parts. The first part follows
the court’s reasoning in trying to establish whether A-1 is liable.
The second part of the commentary suggests an alternative way of
analyzing Martin, by using a reliance-based theory of liability
derived from the Louisiana Civil Code (la théorie de l’apparence).
This theory provides a different result for Martin, and, through its
generality, might prove useful in establishing up a framework
grounded in the Civil Code for future cases.
A. Re-Analyzing Martin Through the Lens of General Tort Law
Principles
1. General Methodology
As a matter of principle, for every wrong done by a person to
another, outside a contractual relationship, there is a private action
with which the victim can recover the damages incurred. 14
However, what the law designates as a “wrong”, and whether or
not a victim has a cause of action, are questions dependent upon
the existence of certain grounds, or foundations, for liability. 15 It is
a matter of “elementary justice” to recognize that, as a default rule,
12. 650 So. 2d. 750 (La. 1995) [hereinafter Able].
13. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 285.
14. GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT. THE BASICS 440 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
15. Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law in WALTER VAN GERVEN,
JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON
NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 17 (Hart Publ’g
2000; published as part of the IUS COMMUNE CASEBOOKS FOR THE COMMON
LAW OF EUROPE series).
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everyone should “bear the ‘general risk associated with
existence’” 16 and that risk cannot simply pass to other
individuals. 17 Liability is an exception to this rule, and, therefore,
without legal grounds, or a legal norm that sets out a certain
conduct as being unlawful, 18 a victim must bear her own loss.19
Hence, tort regulation involves a constant tension between
protecting the legal interest of society at a given moment and the
freedom of action of each individual. 20 This tension is incorporated
in the normative process. It illustrates, or at least should illustrate,
societal views on the kind of conduct generally considered to be
unlawful at a given moment in time, and how such conduct ought
to be deterred. 21
The usual grounds for liability, fault-based liability and strict
liability, would not have served the victim in Martin. A-1
committed no fault of its own when the acts of Johnson’s
employee caused damage, therefore fault-based liability would not
apply.
Things are not necessarily as straightforward when it comes to
strict liability, and that is why the court focused in its discussion on
one such heading of liability: vicarious liability. 22
2. Is A-1 Liable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320?
In Martin, the plaintiff raised the question of whether there was
an employer-employee relationship between A-1 and Johnson.
During the trial, the jury was duly instructed to answer this
16. Karl Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts in
note 15, at 15.
17. Id.
18. “Although every tort is a wrong, not every wrong is a tort.” JOHN C. P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: TORTS 1 (Dennis Patterson series ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
19. Cane, supra note 15, at 17.
20. Larenz & Canaris, supra note 16, at 15.
21. VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 330.
22. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 2, at 515-17. Also called imputed fault,
vicarious liability “imposes liability upon one person for the fault of another.”
Id.

VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra
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question, having in mind the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2320, 23 and the factors used by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in determining the existence of such a relationship. 24 The
jury established that Johnson was an independent contractor, and,
therefore, that no liability should be imposed on A-1 for the
tortious acts of Johnson, under this theory of recovery. 25 In the
assignments of errors, the plaintiff did not dispute this finding. 26
Under article 2320, a victim has to prove two cumulative
elements: (1) that there is an employer-employee relationship, and
(2) that the negligent act of the employee could have been
prevented by the employer. 27 Because the first element was not
present, the court’s analysis stopped there.
3. Is A-1 Liable under the “Apparent Authority” Theory?
Mr. Martin alleged that there was an “apparent authority” with
which Johnson was clothed to act on behalf and in the name of A1. He argued that the conversations he had on the phone were with
A-1 representatives, and that he relied on the fact that A-1 would
deliver his refrigerator to his home, in his decision to purchase the
refrigerator. The plaintiff used the arguments from Able, 28 to
support his assertion.

23. Id. at 530. In Louisiana, an employer is liable for the damages produced
by her employee while in the exercise of the functions of said employment.
24. Amyx v. Henry & Hall, 79 So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1955). The Fifth Circuit
listed the factors, but did not use Amyx as a reference. However, analyzing the
factors is not the purpose of the present note.
25. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 283.
26. Id.
27. WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT LAW
186 (2d ed., West 2009). Although the codal provision requires the second
condition, the courts in Louisiana have consistently ignored it, and do not
require the proof of negligence. Considering the doctrinal and jurisprudential
dispute in this matter, it is of little importance for the study of Martin whether
the liability under article 2320 falls under fault or no-fault liability. See also Cox
v. Gaylord Container Corp., 897 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004) and Doe
v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 978 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2007).
28. Able, 650 So. 2d 750 (1995).
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Before looking at the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning with regard to
this aspect, this commentary will make a short comparative review
of agency law and the contract of mandate.
a. The Contract of Mandate
The contract of mandate is different from the concept of
agency. 29 The concept of agency encompasses a larger pallet of
legal effects than the contract of mandate does. 30 Louisiana’s
provisions regarding the contract of mandate were initially drafted
in a manner similar to the provisions of the French Civil Code.31
Likewise, after the 1997 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, the
conceptual and functional essence of the contract of mandate did
not change. 32
The French Civil Code did not create a institution such as the
common law’s agency. 33 It defined the institution of mandate as a
contract whereby one person (the principal 34) gives to another (the
mandatary) the power to conclude, on his behalf, one or more
juridical acts. 35 The mandatary represents the interests of the
principal. Given the specifics of some activities (e.g., some acts of
commerce), the mandatary will have to execute not only juridical
acts, but also material acts. 36 This distinction bears a great
29. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, 8 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL. LES
CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX CIVILS ET COMMERCIAUX 268 (8th ed., Ed. Cujas 1994).
30. Jana L. Grauberger, From Mere Intrusion to General Confusion:
Agency and Mandate in Louisiana, 72 TUL. L. REV. 257, 265 (1997).
31. A. N. Yiannapoulos, Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana:
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 19 LA. L. REV. 777, 780 (1959).
32. Wendell Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate,
and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087,
1158 (1999). Speaking about the changes that occurred in 1997, the authors
conclude that “while being faithful to Louisiana’s civil heritage, the new law
recognizes the realities of contemporary transactional practice as well as the
need for some uniformity with the law of the surrounding common law states.”
33. Yiannapoulos, supra note 31, at 783.
34. Mandant, in French.
35. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, 2.2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW
286 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1939). The same
definition can be found in MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 277.
36. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 272.
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importance when it comes to liability. The French Civil Code
chose to not expressly regulate the liability of the mandatary with
respect to the material acts, opening the ground for the Court of
Cassation to extend the interpretation and applicability of service
contracts in this context (contrat d’entreprise). 37 In this regard, as
a result of business practices, often times the contract of mandate
becomes a mixed contract, creating ancillary obligations which do
not stem from the traditional notion of mandate. 38 This is the legal
technique by which the service contract is incorporated into the
bigger and complex contract of mandate. Hence, the mandatary
shall be held liable for the juridical acts according to the terms of
the contract of mandate, and shall be liable towards the principal
for the material acts according to the terms of the service contract.
The principal is liable to third parties only according to the general
theory of liability.
The borderline between these two concepts might be blurred,
but no arguments can be offered to stand for the proposition that
they are similar. Louisiana Civil Code article 2989 provides that “a
mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers
authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more
affairs for the principal.” 39 The departure from the French Civil
Code stands in that the notion of “affairs” encompasses both
juridical and material acts. However, the Revision Comments for
article 2989 warn the reader that most of the provisions regarding
the contract of mandate have been construed with the juridical acts
in mind. 40 Louisiana did not import ad litteram the concept of
contract of mandate as prescribed by the French Civil Code.
37. Id. at 272 n.7, citing the decision of the Commercial Section of the
French Court of Cassation. An equivalent English translation would be “service
contract.” A definition of “contrat d'entreprise” could provide that it is a
convention in which the contractor undertakes an obligation to make his talent
available to the client through a compensation previously agreed with the other
party. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 357 (5th ed., Quadrige/PUF
2004).
38. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 273.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989, cmt. (d) (1997).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989, cmt. (e) (1997).
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Instead, the drafters might have thought that the problem regarding
material acts could be simplified if they use the concept of “affair”
to encompass the inclusion of both juridical and material acts. 41
b. Agency
The attempt to find a satisfactory definition of agency is a
rather difficult task. 42 The basic hallmark of agency law is that the
principal bears the consequences created by the fact that she chose
to run her business through an agent. 43 This view embraced by the
Restatement (Third) of Agency points out a rather minor difference
between agency and the contract of mandate. That is, the right of
the principal to control the agent’s behavior and to prevent any
wrongdoing by the agent. 44 In a more complicated manner, but to
serve the same purpose, the contract of mandate incorporates a
service contract (contrat d'entreprise). This way, the Civil Code
contemplates a method by which the principal has “control” over
her mandatary’s behavior with respect to material acts. This design
comes close to the control which agency law entails, but no degree
of equivalence can be seen between the methods of how the
41. For further reading about the influence of the French Civil Code and
doctrine, see Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of
1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5, 22-24. See also
Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and
Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 11-12. For a different perspective, see
Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46
TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972). See also ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUIS CASIMIR
ELISABETH MOREAU-LISLET: FOSTER FATHER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW (LSU
Law Center Pubs. Inst. 1996).
42. OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, DROIT ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES 105 (Dalloz 2000).
See also Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 495
(2011), for brief considerations regarding the attempts to find a proper
definition.
43. The law of agency:
[E]ncompasses the legal consequences of consensual relationships in
which one person (the principal) manifests assent that another person
(the agent) shall, subject to the agent's acts and on the principal's right
of control, have the power to affect the principal's legal relations
through the agent's acts and on the principal's behalf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2006).
44. Dalley, supra note 42, at 513.
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control is exerted. 45 The principal’s control in a contract of
mandate is limited to contractual obligations, while agency law
assumes that the principal is empowered to control the facts
concerning the agent’s behavior, contractual or non-contractual.
This apparent theoretical distinction is important in cases
where the agency relationship looks much like an employment
relationship or projects an image that causes a third party to rely on
the fact that the agent is working for the principal, because in such
a case it might give rise to liability of the principal for the acts of
the agent. 46 In agency law, by default, the principal has a broader
authority to control the behavior of the agent.
The Louisiana Civil Code cannot contemplate such an
interpretation, because the only available means of control the
principal has over the mandatary are contractual in nature, and the
mandatary enjoys more freedom than an agent in common law.
The higher degree of control allowed to the principal over the
agent in common law jurisdictions comes with heightened
responsibility towards third parties. Despite the lower level of
control a principal has over the mandatary, in Louisiana there have
been cases where courts had to find a basis for imposing liability
on a principal, when the equity of the case demanded it. Is the
resort to the doctrine of “apparent authority” a solution?
4. A Short History of Agency Law Intrusion in Louisiana Law
This tendency of departing from the codal provisions with
regards to contract of mandate is not new. 47 In accordance with the
traditional view of the code, the courts have long supported the
idea that vicarious liability and contract of mandate are

45. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 276.
46. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 32, at 1097.
47. Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. 1947). In interpreting the
former language of article 2985, which provided the definition of the contract of
mandate, the Louisiana Supreme Court decreed that the words “‘and in his
name’ are not essential to the definition of a procuration or power of attorney.”
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incompatible, 48 unless there is an employer-employee relationship.
The first decision in which a court imposed liability on a principal
for the negligent act of an agent was in Blanchard v. Ogima. 49 The
Louisiana Supreme Court simplified the analysis to find out
whether there is an employer-employee relationship. Following
this decision, a federal court 50 dealt with the same question that
was raised in Martin, related to “apparent authority.” 51 The court
acknowledged that it wasn't very clear whether it is possible under
Louisiana law to impose vicarious liability on the principal for the
negligent acts of his agent, but argued that as a federal court, they
assume the future position of the courts, which should adopt this
“apparent authority” theory. 52
In Rowell v. Carter Mobile Homes, Inc., 53 in an opinion
delivered by Justice Dennis, the issue was whether a bank (a
principal), that authorized a mobile home dealer to act as an
undisclosed agent 54 was liable for the injuries that were suffered by
48. Wendell Holmes, Ruminations on Independent Fire Insurance Co. v.
Able Moving and Storage Co.: Principal's Vicarious Tort Liability for Negligent
Acts of an Agent's Servant, 56 LA. L. REV. 571 (1996) [hereinafter Holmes,
Ruminations].
49. 215 So. 2d 902 (La. 1968) “A master or employer is liable for the
tortious conduct of a servant or employee which is within the scope of authority
or employment.” Id. at 902.
50. Arceneaux v. Texaco, 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter
Arceneaux].
51. The definition provided by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8
(Am. Law Inst. 1958): Apparent authority represents “the power to affect the
legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly
as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's
manifestations to such third persons.” Apparent authority is different from actual
authority, in the sense that it is created by written or spoken words or any other
conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to
believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the
person purporting to act for him. Id. § 27.
52. “Louisiana courts have drawn freely from the common law and the
Restatements of the Law in developing both tort and agency doctrine. We may
assume for present purposes, without deciding, that they would proceed along
the Restatement path and adopt the rule of apparent authority in tort cases.”
Arceneaux, 623 F.2d at 926.
53. 500 So. 2d 748 (1987) [hereinafter Rowell].
54. Note that for an accurate use of legal terminology when discussing
about the contract of mandate, the parlance involves the principal and the
mandatary. See LA. CIV. CODE Title XV. Representation and Mandate. On the
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the buyer of the mobile home, due to the negligent repair of the
floor (which was performed by the bank's agent). 55 The court again
simplified the legal analysis, to the extent of whether the agent was
an employee for the principal or not, concluding that absent any
physical control of the agent's activity within the scope of the
mandate given, the principal was not liable for the tortious act of
its agent. 56 This decision recited passages from Blanchard, but its
approach remained faithful to the civilian doctrine.
5. Louisiana Supreme Court and “Apparent Authority”
In Able, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in the event
that there is no employer-employee relationship, a principal could
become vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its “agent”,
relying on the doctrine of “apparent authority.” 57
The facts in Able are strikingly similar to those in Martin. The
plaintiff used the yellow pages to find a transporter for her
furniture. She found an advertisement for a national mover, called
“Bekins”. However, at the bottom of the advertisement there was a
disclaimer informing the potential customers that the local operator
of “Bekins” was a company called “Able Moving & Storage Co.”
According to the testimony heard during the trial, the plaintiff was
under the impression that she had hired Bekins, and had no
knowledge at any point that she had contracted with Able. The
moving operations were conducted by two workmen. The plaintiff
handed them a check indicating that the recipient of the payment
was “Bekins.” After Able’s employees left, a fire consumed the
plaintiff’s house. It was later established that the fire was caused

other hand, in agency law the mandatary is referred as agent. Unfortunately,
legal scholars, judges and lawyers are using agent and mandatary
interchangeably, though they have different meanings.
55. Rowell, 500 So. 2d at 749.
56. Id. at 751. As a side note, the court tangentially touched on the issue of
“control.”
57. For a short exposé of the facts, see Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48,
at 572.
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by a cigarette butt left there by one of the workmen. 58 While it was
clear that the workman and Able were liable, the plaintiff raised
the question of whether Bekins was liable, for creating the
impression that she was dealing with Bekins.
The court resorted to the common law Restatement (Second) of
Agency to motivate the application of apparent authority to a noncontractual relationship between the principal and the victim.59
The court also distinguished Able from Rowell, and held that when
a principal makes a representation to a third party, there is an
agency relationship between said principal and the agent and,
because of this representation, the third person justifiably relies
upon the care or skill of such apparent agent, the principal is
subject to liability to the third party for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the party appearing to be her agent. 60
The language from the decision suggests that the court read the
applicable provisions from the Civil Code, found no explicit rule to
apply to the facts sub judice, and borrowed the doctrine of
“apparent authority” from the Restatement, 61 in order to create a
legal basis for imposing liability on the principal for the acts of the
agent. Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court confused the
concept of “apparent authority” with the concept of “agency by
estoppel.” In a previous case also decided by the Supreme Court, 62
the court emphasized that the doctrine of “apparent authority” is
based on a contract theory which says that a party ought to be
bound by what she says and manifests, rather than by what she
intends, and, therefore, the third party who contracts with the agent
need only prove reliance on the appearance of authority
58. Abel, 650 So. 2d at 751.
59. Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 572. See also supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Am. Law Inst. 1958):
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant
or other agent as if he were such.
62. Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960 (1989).
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manifested. 63 Agency by estoppel is based on tort principles of
preventing loss by an innocent person. The third party has to prove
reliance and a change in position, 64 which damaged the third party,
and that it would be unjust to allow the principal to deny the
existence of agency relationship.
Although there is no explicit language in the decision, 65 the
rationale behind this solution could stem from Louisiana Civil
Code article 4. Equally important to determine why the court
resorted to this solution is the fact that an element of emotional
sympathy could have weighed decisively in rendering the decision.
Shortly after this incident, Able’s headquarter was also destroyed
in a fire, leaving the plaintiff without any possibility of recovering
the damages. 66
6. Applying Able to the Facts in Martin
In Louisiana, matters pertaining to civil law which are not
clearly resolved by the Code should not be solved by the courts
with the doctrine of precedents, but rather resort to an established
jurisprudence constante. 67
In Martin, the plaintiff based his entire theory of recovery on
the rule established in Able. The court narrowed the spectrum of
Able, focusing on the reliance element of the claim. The court
essentially asked whether the victim’s change of position was
determined by her reliance on the representation made by A-1.
Conversely, in order to trigger the liability of the principal, the
victim needed to have changed her position because of her
63. Id. at 963-64.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (Am. Law Inst. 1958),
defines a change in position as “payment of money, expenditure of labor,
suffering a loss or subjection to legal liability.”
65. Nor in the previously mentioned decisions, in supra section IV.A.4.
66. Able, 650 So. 2d at 752-53.
67. Olivier Moréteau, Francois-Xavier Martin Revisited: Louisiana Views
on Codification, Jurisprudence, Legal Education and Practice, 60 LA. BAR J.
475, 478. See also id. at 479 n.33 for a critique of the attempt to apply the theory
of binding precedents to cases regulated by the Civil Code.
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reasonable belief that she dealt with a “servant or other agent” 68 of
the principal. 69 In Martin, the court stated that there were no facts
to support the proposition that Mr. Martin relied on the apparent
authority when he made the decision to purchase the refrigerator,
or when he allowed the deliverymen to enter on his house. 70
Johnson’s truck had no sign on it, but the deliverymen were
wearing Johnson uniforms. Although the court acknowledged that
the rule in Able was correct, it distinguished Martin from Able in
the sense that in the former case, there was no evidence that the
plaintiff “would not have made the payment had he known the
facts of the delivery process.” 71 It is also possible that, since the
plaintiff already recovered $100,000 from Johnson, this might have
had some influence on the decision.
B. A Civilian Alternative to the Doctrine of “Apparent Authority”
1. Reanalyzing Able
One author suggested with regards to Able, that the court
“instead of looking to agency law and apparent authority . . . need
only have looked to the Civil Code articles.” 72 This approach is
equally applicable to Martin. This part first overviews the effects
of the rule stated in Able, and then proposes a theory of recovery
based on the Civil Code.
The rule affirmed in Able has been regarded as a wrong
decision by a small number of authors. 73 The scholarship on this

68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Am. Law Inst. 1958).
69. Able, 650 So. 2d at 752.
70. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 284.
71. Id.
72. Grauberger, supra note 30, at 274.
73. Id. at 272-73. For an approach that salutes this step taken by the
Supreme Court, See Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 576-77, 581. The
author calls this decision “a potentially major expansion of the doctrine of
apparent authority by opening its application to the field of torts.” See also
Michael B. North, Comment: Qui Facit Per Alium, Facit Per Se:
Representation, Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the Turn of
the Twenty-First Century, 72 TUL. L. REV. 279 (1997).
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matter has drawn attention primarily upon the unintended
consequences on the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 74 It may
seem that, in Louisiana, 75 the franchisor should guard against any
negative outcome by extending their insurance policy to cover the
acts of a franchisee’s employees, as one author has suggested. 76
This uncertainty77 stems from the poor language used by the
Supreme Court, which comfortably reproduced the rule existing in
agency law.
In 1997 (two years after Able was decided), the Civil Code was
revised, and one of the changes involved Title XV, on the Contract
of Mandate. The Louisiana Civil Code does not mention at any
point “apparent authority” within Title XV (Representation and
Mandate), or anywhere else, for that matter. The legislature
probably intended to import the rule from the common law, and
similarly to Able, into a codal provision, and therefore adopted
article 3021 regarding the “putative mandatary.” 78 It seems it was
an attempt to introduce a reference to “apparent authority,” but
through a civilian-oriented approach and with civilian terminology.
Nonetheless, the new language from article 3021 does not offer a
solution to cases such as Martin or Able. Rather, it is an “old wine
in new bottle”, 79 because it does not apply to tort cases. Its
applicability is limited to contractual issues, and it regulates how
the principal is liable toward a third party in good faith.
74. Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 579. The author depicts a
common example, when a McDonald’s employee commits a tortious act. The
question under the rule in Able is whether the victim should prove that she chose
McDonald’s from Wendy’s or Burger King, relying on the skill and care of the
agents, as contemplated by Section 267.
75. Id. at 579. See also the line of cases cited at 579 n.49, id.
76. Id. at 580.
77. Grauberger, supra note 30, at 259. The author contemplates this path as
having “destructive effects of the introduction of common-law agency principles
into the Louisiana legal system.” Able also affects other business areas such as
hospitals, and large retail chains.
78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3021: “One who causes a third person to believe that
another person is his mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith
contracts with the putative mandatary. ”
79. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 32, at 1151.
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In addition, the current language of article 3021 ought to be
read in conjunction with the general rules laid down in the general
law of obligations. 80 The second paragraph of article 1967 81 has
the character of a general norm, and article 3021 is a special
provision. Two rules of interpretation apply to such a situation.
First, specialia generalibus derrogant—the special provision is
applied with priority over the general rule, when the two come in
conflict. 82 Second, generalia specialibus non derogant—when the
special rule is silent, the gaps can be filled by resorting to the
general rule. 83
2. A Reliance-Based Theory of Liability
Seemingly, there is no direct and clear norm in the Civil Code
for a situation like the one presented in Martin. There is a gap 84 in
the legislation. In such a case, the court would have been entitled
to proceed according to article 4. Many pages have been written

80. See Book III, Title 3 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
81. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967:
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery
may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a
result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.
82. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE AU DROIT 450 (7th ed.,
Dalloz 2006); BORIS STARCK, HENRI ROLAND & LAURENT BOYER,
INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 131 (3d ed., Litec 1991).
83. TERRÉ, supra note 82, at 450.
84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1: “The sources of law are legislation and custom.”
Articles 2 and 3 define “legislation” and “custom”. Accordingly, LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2, provides that: “Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.” and
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 states that: “Custom results from practice repeated of a
long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom
may not abrogate legislation.” For the purpose of this commentary, “custom”
presents little interest because the confusion of treating the relationship between
principal and mandatary as a agency relationship does not meet the two
requirements of longa consuetudo and opinio juris. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3, cmt.
(b) (1987).

696

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

with respect to this article. 85 Two lines of interpretation have been
particularly relevant.
On one hand, Justice Dennis extrapolated this provision by
setting up a methodology which would guide the judges who are
faced with this kind of situation. 86 The author compared the judge
to a “legislator's helpmate” 87 and advocated a constant devotion to
the civilian doctrine. 88 In this interpretation, the judge should first
try to deliver a solution according to the scope and meaning of the
Civil Code, and only after this fails, should the judge use the
liberty conferred by the “equity” of article 4. Regardless, the judge
should not automatically look to common law for guidance in such
circumstances.
On the other hand, Professor Palmer’s article argues that this
permanent guidance of the Code should be read less strictly, 89 and
that this legal provision leaves room for importing common law
rules. 90 Based on this interpretation, ruling on “equity” prevails

85. For an extensive discussion of “equity” as referred in Louisiana Civil
Code article 4, see Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed
Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7
(1994). See also Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and
Well, 64 TUL. L. REV. 147, 169 (1989).
86. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
87. Justice Dennis underlined the fact that “the judge does not have absolute
discretion but is required to return again and again to the Code seeking its
guiding values and adhering as closely to them as possible.” Id. at 17.
88. “When dealing with the civil law, the judge’s constitutional oath to
support the law requires that he recognize that the Civil Code is the primary
source of law.” Id. See also Grauberger, supra note 30, at 275. This author is of
opinion that the courts are not allowed to import common law principles in the
Louisiana Law because it is not consistent with the Constitution of Louisiana.
89. Palmer, supra note 85, at 19:
In a limited number of cases [the judges] proceed by analogy from the
Code's other provisions, as good civilian judges are thought to do. Yet
in others, they import and transplant concepts that have no analogy
within the Code or within the civilian vocabulary. In other instances,
they build from the prior precedents that they established in novel
cases.
90. “In Louisiana today, practitioners do not readily recognize civilian
connotations in the term 'equity,' but they rather easily associate that word with
particular common-law doctrines absorbed within the fabric of the law.” Palmer,
supra note 85, at 51.
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without any other intellectual debates, and justice should be served
regardless of the origin of the legal solution.
The Code as a system should not be treated as an “arbitrary and
spontaneous product,” 91 but rather as the result of the “labor of
reason in the past centuries.” 92 After reading the Louisiana Civil
Code, it may appear that it does not provide a theory of recovery
for the victim, with respect to the facts in Martin, but, after a closer
look, by correlating multiple articles of the code, a theory of
liability can be found within the spirit of the code.
In the common law, if a principal unreasonably fails to control
an unauthorized agent and a third party relies on the agent to her
detriment, the principal will be liable under the theory of agency
by estoppel. 93 Similarly, civilian jurisdictions like France and
Quebec have identified a new basis of liability in such situations
based on a theory called “la théorie de l’apparence.” 94 Based on
this theory, reasonable reliance can be a binding source of
obligations, very similar to a situation where the equitable remedy
of estoppel would apply. 95 Obligations are created for the benefit
of a third party, who legitimately relied on a situation created or
under the control of the obligor, and acted accordingly. 96 The
theory draws its origins from the Roman Law principle of error
communis facit jus, 97 but it is more developed and complex
nowadays. French doctrine 98 and jurisprudence 99 developed the
91. Levasseur, supra note 4, at 697.
92. Id.
93. Dalley, supra note 42, at 514.
94. Theory of appearance, in English.
95. About how the common law estoppel completes the théorie de
l'apparence, see Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone Between Contract
and Tort: The Role of Estoppel and Reliance in Mapping out the Law of
Obligations in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004 at 78-79 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara
C. Steininger eds., Springer 2005).
96. Jean-Francois Lerouge, Uniform Computer Information Transaction
Act: The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned under Contractual Law:
Suggested Solutions on a European and American Level, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 403, 411 (1999).
97. A common error is a source of law.
98. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL.
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 757-96 (3d ed., L.G.D.J. 1990).
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theory starting from Geny’s liberal interpretation, 100 but without
resorting to “equity” or other rules not prescribed by the Code. It is
considered to be a theory contained in the French Civil Code,
despite the fact that it is not based on an explicit and clear norm.
This theory of liability can easily be fit into the framework of
Louisiana Civil Code, and the articles regarding tort law (23152322). The Civil Code already has expressions of reliance-based
theories of liability in contractual relations. Articles 1967 and 3021
create obligations in situations where an innocent victim relies on
an appearance of facts to her detriment. The French théorie de
l'apparence offers a framework for a more general basis for
liability.
In order to impose liability on someone based on the théorie de
l'apparence, there are two conditions that have to be met: (1) the
apparent situation should be different from the real, objective
situation; 101 and (2) the victim should legitimately rely on the fact
that the situation corresponds to reality–in other words the victim
must be in error. 102
In Martin, this theory is connected to the allegedly false
representation to the victim that Johnson was an “apparent
employee” of A-1. Under the test laid down above, and
considering the facts provided in the decision, A-1 should be

99. The French Court of Cassation has used the theory of appearance to lift
the corporate veil and impose liability on shareholders, who were abusing the
privilege of incorporation. William Tetley, Q.C., Arrest, Attachment, and
Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895, 1944 (1999).
100. See FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN
DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 20 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed., LSLI 1954) for
an extensive counterargument to the exegetic French school of thought.
101. GHESTIN, supra note 98, at 784.
102. The current trend in the French doctrine is that the error should be
legitimate, which regards the standard to be that a reasonable person, if they had
been in the same situation, would have regarded the situation as real. Prior
theories required error to be “common”. The main difference is important as a
practical matter, because with regard to legitimate error, the situation is analyzed
in concreto, whereas the common error is scrutinized in abstracto (therefore
more strictly). Id. at 771-74.
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liable, because both conditions are met. Mr. Martin was in a
legitimate error, mainly because he paid the delivery fee to A-1
and because at no point he did know he would have to deal with an
independent contractor. It does not matter whether the plaintiff
changed his position or not. Under the théorie de l'apparence, A-1
may be liable, and this approach also provides a better framework
to guide courts in their approach to future similar cases.
V. CONCLUSION
When talking about the process of drafting the French Civil
Code, Portalis said that it is virtually impossible to anticipate all
situations and regulate them. 103 To that extent, the Martin case
represents an exempli gratia.
In this author’s opinion, the court in Martin had enough legal
provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code to construct an argument in
accordance with principles grounded in the civilian tradition. The
resort to the common law concept of “apparent authority” was
unnecessary, and the implementation of this concept, without
taking into considerations the nuanced differences between the
contract of mandate and agency, may create confusion in Louisiana
jurisprudence.
Based on the théorie de l'apparence, the court may have
reached a different result in Martin. By introducing this theory, this
case note advocates for a civilian solution to the problems that
spring from cases such as Martin 104 and Able. 105
Probably a more serious problem, discussed in passing in this
note, can be identified in the treatment of the contract of
mandate—in particular, the confusion created from equating
mandate with agency. It has been argued that the codal provisions
are behind the present business realities, and there is a need for
103. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoléon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV.
762, 768 (1969).
104. 117 So. 3d 281 (2013).
105. 650 So. 2d. 750 (1995).
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harmonizing the rather complex doctrine of representation. 106 The
1997 revision of the law of representation tried to keep the civilian
terminology and conceptual framework intact, but cases like
Martin and Able show that, in order to respect this choice of the
legislature, one has to look at the Civil Code as a whole 107 and
interpret its provisions based on its spirit.

106. North, supra note 73, at 280.
107. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13.

